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I   INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, the Financial System Inquiry (‘FSI’), headed by Mr 
David Murray, released its final report.P767F1P The FSI was to ‘lay out a “blueprint” for 
the financial system over the next decade’,P768F2 P and the terms of reference were 
wide-ranging. Among other things, the FSI was charged with refreshing the 
‘philosophy, principles and objectives underpinning the development of a well-
functioning financial system, including … assessing the effectiveness and need 
for financial regulation’.P769F3P There was no specific mention of self-regulation in the 
FSI’s terms of reference, however, there has been a high level of self-regulation 
and co-regulation in the financial system for some years. Self-regulation and co-
regulation are also explicitly incorporated into the consumer protection 
regulatory framework for financial services. Given this, the FSI Final Report 
appropriately canvassed, albeit in broad terms, the role of self-regulation for 
financial services.P770F4P  
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1 Financial System Inquiry, Treasury (Cth), Financial System Inquiry Final Report (28 November 2014) 
(‘FSI Final Report’). 
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Coincidentally, around the same time as the terms of reference for the FSI 
were released, the most recent version of the Australian Code of Banking 
Practice (‘Banking Code’) came into effect. This document, comprised of the 
Code of Banking PracticeP771F 5 P and the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee 
Mandate,P772F6P is the third major incarnation of the Banking Code. The first version 
of the Banking Code was released in 1993 as the Code of Banking Practice,P773F7 P 
following a recommendation from a parliamentary committee,P774F8P and it was one of 
the first industry-based consumer protection codes in the financial services 
sector. 
The Banking Code is described by the Australian Bankers’ Association 
(‘ABA’) as ‘the banking industry’s customer charter on best banking  
practice standards’.P775F9P The two previous major incarnations of the Banking Code 
represented large advances on the consumer protections available at the time, 
with the result that customers of subscribers to the Banking Code were afforded 
greater protections than customers of financial institutions that were required 
only to comply with the legislation.P776F10P The third major incarnation of the Banking 
Code was developed following a 2007–08 independent review, but ultimately 
many of the recommendations of the review became superseded by legislative 
change. Given the now extensive legislative coverage of consumer protection 
issues in financial services, one commentator has suggested that the Banking 
Code may not be needed in the future.P777F11 P The Banking Code has also been recently 
criticised as a ‘toothless tiger’, particularly in regards to its enforcement 
infrastructure.P778F12 
                                                 
5 Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (at 1 February 2014) (‘2013 Code’). 
6 Australian Bankers’ Association, Code Compliance Monitoring Committee Mandate (at 1 February 2014) 
(‘CCMC Mandate’). The 2013 Code and the CCMC Mandate were published as a single document. 
7  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (at 3 November 1993) (‘1993 Code’). 
8 The 1991 Martin Committee on Banking and Deregulation recommended that ‘a code of banking 
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history of the development of the 1993 Code, see Wickrema Weerasooria and Nerida Wallace, Banker–
Customer: Resolving Banking Disputes (Longman Professional, 1994) ch 19. 
9 Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (2011) <http://www.bankers.asn.au/Industry-
Standards/ABAs-Code-of-Banking-Practice>. 
10 Note that credit unions and building societies have also established a detailed code of practice: Customer 
Owned Banking Association, Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice (at 1 January 2014) (‘Customer 
Owned Banking Code’).  
11 Prudence Weaver, ‘Code of Banking Practice 2013’ in Allan L Tyree and John Sheahan (eds) ‘Banking 
Law and Banking Practice’ (2014) 25 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 43, 47. 
12 Andrew Wilkie, ‘Improving Consumer Protection for Bank Customers’ (Press Release, 10 September 
2012) <http://www.andrewwilkie.org/content/index.php/awmp/press_extended/improving_consumer_ 
protection_for_bank_customers>. 
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Despite the existence of a proliferation of voluntary codes,P779F 13 P the role of 
industry codes, and specifically the Banking Code, has been the subject of only 
limited academic analysis.P780F 14 P The review of the sector by the FSI therefore 
provides an opportune time to re-examine the role of codes in the regulatory 
framework for financial services. This article focuses on the Banking Code and 
the extent to which it influences consumer protection standards in a sector that is 
characterised by complex and extensive government regulation.  
In Part II, this article provides an overview of self-regulation and co-
regulation generally, and in the Australian financial services sector. The 
overview includes a description of the ways in which self-regulation and co-
regulation are explicitly incorporated into the Australian regulatory framework 
for financial services. It also provides a brief introduction to the scope and 
coverage of the Banking Code, and to the discussion of self-regulation in the FSI.  
Part III of this article then describes and analyses some key clauses in the 
Banking Code, and the relationship between the development of these standards 
in the Banking Code and the parallel development of consumer protection 
legislation in financial services. It finds that, for a number of important consumer 
policy issues, including disclosure, responsible lending, and dispute resolution, 
the Banking Code provisions have largely been superseded by legislation in 
recent years, through the changes introduced by the Financial Services Reform 
Act 2001 (Cth) (‘FSRA’), amending the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
(‘Corporations Act’), and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
(Cth) (‘NCCPA’), including the National Credit Code (‘NCC’).P781F15P  
This expansion of legislation into policy areas that were once covered 
primarily by the Banking Code might be grounds for arguing that the Banking 
Code now has limited relevance as a consumer protection instrument.P782F16P However, 
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Commission, ePayments Code (at 1 July 2012) (‘ePayments Code’). 
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and Comment’ (2013) 28 Australian Banking & Finance Law Bulletin 139; Gail Pearson, ‘Business Self-
regulation’ (2012) 20 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 34; Nicholas Mirzai, ‘A Compulsory 
Banking Code of Conduct: Better Practice or Misguided Effort?’ (2012) 28 Australian Banking & 
Finance Law Bulletin 50; Gail Pearson, ‘The Place of Codes of Conduct in Regulating Financial 
Services’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law Review 333; Christine Godfrey, ‘The Revised Code of Banking Practice: 
Is It Made of Straw, or Does It Have Enough Bricks To Provide Effective Consumer Protection?’ (2006) 
14 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 146.  
15  NCCPA sch 1. 
16 Prudence Weaver, for example, suggests that ‘[i]t is worth considering, however, whether there will be 
any need for a new Code given the increasing amount of regulation that now applies to banking practice’: 
Weaver, above n 11, 47. 
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this article refutes that argument by showing that there are at least five ways in 
which the Banking Code does, and can continue to, influence the development of 
consumer protection standards in the banking sector, and in the financial services 
sector more widely.  
First, the Banking Code provides consumer rights in areas not currently 
covered by legislation, including where legislation might be an inappropriate 
response to an identified problem. This includes rights in relation to account 
combination, independent rights in relation to compliance with other agreements 
and guidelines, specific measures for vulnerable groups, and the imposition of 
aspirational standards on banks.  
Secondly, the Banking Code provides coverage for some customers and 
products that are not afforded coverage in the relevant legislation. This is 
particularly important for small business customers, as the protections in the 
NCCPA do not extend to small business loans.  
Thirdly, the Banking Code provides body to the general obligations 
contained in the legislation. The procedural protections afforded to third party 
guarantors are one example here. Fourthly, the standards in the Banking Code 
influence the standards in the legislation, and vice versa, in what I have called a 
‘regulatory dance’.  
Finally, the Banking Code influences the standards imposed upon, and 
expected of, other members of the financial services industry, through a 
regulatory dance between industry codes, and through the reference to good 
industry practice in the decision-making of the external dispute resolution 
schemes.  
Together, these five examples illustrate the various ways in which the 
Banking Code can and does contribute to the raising of standards for banks, non-
banks and the financial services sector generally, despite the encroachment of the 
legislation in some key policy areas. These examples demonstrate the continued 
relevance of the Banking Code.  
This article then briefly considers some shortcomings in the Banking Code, 
and a suggestion for changing the regulatory incentives so that the ‘free rider’ 
effect is minimised and the industry is given greater encouragement to address 
the identified shortcomings.  
This article concludes by reflecting that, despite the shortcomings in the 
Banking Code as a consumer protection tool and the potential for its standards to 
sometimes be rendered redundant by legislative developments, the Banking 
Code’s influence on raising standards should be acknowledged. Any changes to 
the regulatory framework following the FSI should accommodate a continued 
role for self-regulation in consumer protection and encourage greater regulatory 
incentives for improvements in these arrangements. 
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II   SELF-REGULATION AND CO-REGUALTION IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 
A   Defining Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation 
The terms self-regulation and co-regulation are popularly used by 
governments and policy agencies in the context of the financial services sector, 
but the precise scope of these terms is not always clear. Indeed, the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably.P783F17P  
Self-regulation in Australia (as elsewhere) has taken a variety of forms with 
mixed success. Writing in 2000, an Australian Taskforce on Industry Self-
Regulation found that there was a ‘broad and diverse range of self-regulation at 
the national level affecting consumers’, with there being ‘no single model for 
industry self-regulation as it depends on what is trying to be achieved’.P784F18P This 
Taskforce also suggested that self-regulation can move along a spectrum of 
intervention. At one end of this spectrum might be voluntary standards for 
information disclosure. In the middle of the spectrum might be more 
interventionist initiatives, such as customer charters or industry codes that are not 
monitored or enforced. Finally, industry codes that mirror regulation, with 
mechanisms to monitor compliance and facilitation of consumer redress 
following a lack of compliance, are regarded as being at the most interventionist 
end of this spectrum. P785F19P  
Others have referred to self-regulation as part of the decentred approach to 
regulation, which in turn has been described as ‘hybrid (combining governmental 
and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a number of different 
strategies simultaneously or sequentially), and … indirect’.P786F 20 P Further, self-
regulation in this context includes the harnessing of ‘internal corporate 
bureaucracies to achieve public policy goals’.P787F 21 P In the Australian financial 
services sector, it has also been suggested that self-regulation involves a risk 
transfer: 
Self- or co-regulation shifts some risks of regulation from regulatory agencies to 
industry. This process of industry responsibilisation engages the reputation of the 
                                                 
17 Ann Wardrop, ‘Co-regulation, Responsive Regulation and the Reform of Australia’s Retail Electronic 
Payment Systems’ (2014) 30 Law in Context 197, 203. 
18 Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, Treasury (Cth), Industry Self-regulation in Consumer Markets 
(2000) 24 (‘Industry Self-regulation Report’).  
19 Ibid 20. 
20 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (Discussion Paper No 4, Economic and Social Research 
Council Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
January 2002) 6. 
21 Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets (Hart 
Publishing, 2nd ed, 2007) 114, citing Christine Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The 
New Corporate Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 207. 
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whole industry by industry bodies making their own rules for self-regulation and 
through industry-based resolution of complaints or disputes with consumers. P788 F22 
The benefits of self-regulation when compared to government regulation are 
said to include: 
• a reduction in costs of information, rule-making, and enforcement for 
business and government; 
• the ability to fine-tune statutory rules to a particular industry; 
• the likelihood of greater levels of voluntary commitment and compliance 
because of industry involvement setting the rules; 
• the ability to bring industry expertise to determine appropriate standards;  
• the ability to facilitate industry flexibility to provide greater consumer 
choice and be more responsive to changing consumer expectations; and 
• the ability to respond quickly to technological and other changes.P789F23 
As identified above, industry codes of conduct can be seen as towards the 
more interventionist end of the self-regulatory spectrum. Indeed, the regulator, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), describes codes 
as sitting ‘at the apex of industry self-regulatory initiatives’.P790F24P ASIC’s approach 
to code approval is therefore designed to ensure that the term ‘code’ is reserved 
for self-regulatory instruments with the features of having binding and 
enforceable rules, transparent processes for developing and reviewing the rules 
(including consultation with consumer representatives), and effective monitoring 
and compliance arrangements.P791F 25 P According to ASIC, such codes can deliver 
improved consumer confidence in a particular industry or industries,P792F 26 P raise 
standards and complement legislative requirements,P793F27 P and result in measurable 
consumer benefits.P794F28P  
Others have also suggested broader roles for self-regulation and industry 
codes. For example, Webb has referred to industry codes as being able to act ‘as 
innovative voicing mechanisms for NGOs, industry associations and hybrid 
multistakeholder groups’.P795F29P Webb has also suggested that codes 
                                                 
22 Gail Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
15. 
23 See, eg, Industry Self-regulation Report, above n 18, 20–1; Ramsay, above n 21, 116; Pearson, ‘Business 
Self-regulation’, above n 14, 36. 
24 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 183 – Approval of Financial 
Services Sector Codes of Conduct (at 1 March 2013) [RG 183.2] (‘ASIC RG183’). 
25 ASIC RG183 [RG 183.20], [RG 183.23]. 
26 ASIC RG183 [RG 183.2]. 
27 ASIC RG183 [RG 183.4]. 
28 ASIC RG183 [RG 183.19]. 
29 Kernaghan Webb, ‘Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon’ in Kernaghan Webb (ed), 
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, 2004) 3, 16.  
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can act as incubators for new legal approaches by testing out what does and does 
not work, refining and enhancing legal approaches, addressing activities not easily 
controlled through legislative techniques, helping define what constitutes legally 
acceptable conduct, assisting in addressing some of the weaknesses of laws, being 
incorporated into the terms of legal instruments, extending the reach of legislative 
techniques, stimulating ‘beyond legislative compliance’ behaviour, and enhancing 
the enforcement capabilities of governments. P796F30P  
Some of these roles suggested by Webb can be observed in the development 
and implementation of the Banking Code, discussed later in this article.  
As with self-regulation, co-regulation does not necessarily have a fixed 
meaning. Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that co-regulation is ‘usually taken  
to mean industry-association self-regulation with some oversight and/or 
ratification by government’.P797F 31 P They also suggest that co-regulation should 
involve public interest groups (eg, consumer groups).P798F32P Others, however, suggest 
that government oversight of self-regulatory schemes is a form of self-regulation, 
rather than a form of co-regulation.P799F33P  
Ideas of co-regulation can also be traced along a continuum, from very 
formal arrangements, where there are specific regulatory goals to be achieved by 
industry with significant state oversight and involvement, to less formal 
arrangements, where the role of the state is to provide input into the development 
of the rules and then to provide for periodic review.P800F34 
The 1996–97 Financial System Inquiry considered various approaches to 
regulation in this sector, including a statutory approach, a co-regulatory approach 
and a self-regulatory approach. The final report of this inquiry described a co-
regulatory approach as being one ‘where “framework legislation” sets out general 
principles for market conduct and consumer protection and the specific 
regulation of transactions is provided through codes in particular industries’.P801F35P In 
contrast, in a self-regulatory approach, schemes administered by industry groups 
have no specific legislative backing.P802F36 
In this article, the term self-regulation is confined to industry and firm 
schemes or arrangements that do not exist as a result of a legislative compulsion, 
and where government does not have a formal role in monitoring, enforcing or 
reviewing the schemes or arrangements. Industry alone is responsible for 
deciding upon the rules and the mechanisms for reviewing, monitoring, and 
enforcing those rules, and the role of government is limited to providing input 
into the development of the arrangements. However, once the state is given a 
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 102, cited in Wardrop, above n 17, 202–3. 
32 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 31, 102. 
33 Wardrop, above n 17, 203. 
34 Ibid 204. 
35 Financial System Inquiry, Treasury (Cth), Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 258. 
36 Ibid. 
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more formal role, the scheme is more clearly described as a co-regulatory one. 
Thus, it is possible for an initially self-regulatory scheme or arrangement to 
morph into a co-regulatory arrangement as a result of increasing state 
involvement.  
 
B   The Integration of Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in the  
Australian Financial Services Sector 
In the Australian financial services sector, self-regulation and co-regulation 
have been part of the regulatory landscape for consumer protection for some 
time. Co-regulation is specifically provided for, as since 2001 ASIC has had a 
power to approve industry codes and industry dispute resolution schemes in the 
financial services sector,P803F 37 P and it has had a similar power in relation to the 
consumer credit sector since 2009.P804F38 P To support the exercise of its powers in this 
area, ASIC has released extensive guidance to parties seeking approval of a 
dispute resolution scheme P805F39P or code of practice.P806F40 P  
There are also some explicit regulatory requirements or benefits attributable 
to industry members that participate in co-regulatory arrangements. For example, 
holders of an Australian financial services licence must belong to an ASIC-
approved industry-based external dispute resolution (‘EDR’) scheme if providing 
services to retail clients.P807F41P Similarly, holders of an Australian credit licence must 
belong to an ASIC-approved industry EDR scheme. P808F42P Failure to belong to, and 
maintain membership of, an approved EDR scheme will amount to a breach of a 
licence condition, exposing the financial services provider or credit business to 
the risk of having their license suspended or cancelled,P809F43P and/or of being subject 
to a banning order.P810F44 
In relation to codes, the Future of Financial Advice (‘FoFA’) changes to the 
Corporations Act in 2012 exempted financial services providers from certain fee 
disclosure obligations (the ‘opt-in disclosure requirement’) if they belonged to an 
ASIC-approved code (meeting specific requirements).P811F45 P Perhaps in part due to 
                                                 
37 For industry codes, see Corporations Act ss 962CA, 1101A; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12A(3) (‘ASIC Act’). For dispute resolution schemes, see Corporations Act 
s 912A; Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) regs 7.6.02(3)–(4). 
38 For codes, see NCCPA s 241; ASIC Act s 12A(3). For dispute resolution schemes, see NCCPA s 47; 
National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) regs 10(3)–(4). 
39 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 139 – Approval and Oversight of 
External Dispute Resolution Schemes (at 13 June 2013) (‘ASIC RG139’). 
40 ASIC RG183. See also Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia, above n 22, 48–53 
for a detailed discussion of how ASIC exercises its codes approval power. 
41 Corporations Act ss 912A(1)(g), 912A(2)(b)(i). The term ‘retail client’ is defined at ss 761G–761GA. 
42 NCCPA s 47(1)(i). 
43 Corporations Act s 915C(1). 
44 Corporations Act s 920A(1). 
45 Corporations Act s 962CA provides an exemption from the obligations in s 962K.  
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some uncertainty about the retention of this requirement,P812F46P no codes have been 
approved by ASIC for the purposes of the exemption. 
Interestingly, in contrast to the requirement to belong to an approved EDR 
scheme, there is no legislative obligation for financial services providers or credit 
businesses to belong to an ASIC-approved code, or indeed to belong to any code 
at all. In 2001, the then Deputy Chair of ASIC suggested that this ‘reflects the 
desire to allow appropriate flexibility in the ways in which industry players meet 
their obligations under FSR [Financial Services Reform]’.P813F47P Further, apart from 
the FoFA requirement discussed above, there is no explicit regulatory benefit 
attaching to membership of an approved code.P814F 48 P This absence of an explicit 
regulatory requirement or regulatory benefit may be part of the reason that there 
does not appear to have been any industry codes submitted for ASIC approval 
outside the FoFA context.P815F49P  
Despite the lack of a legislative obligation to belong to a code, it is clear that 
self-regulation through codes is strongly established in the Australian regulatory 
framework for financial services. Further, it is arguable that, at least in this 
sector, self-regulation initiatives are no longer generally seen as defensive 
mechanisms, designed to forestall government regulation. Instead, they have 
become more forward-looking initiatives, focusing on improving standards and 
providing genuine consumer protection.P816F50 
 
                                                 
46 Regulations to amend some of the FoFA requirements, including the opt-in disclosure requirement, were 
made in 2014 (see Corporations Amendment (Streamlining Future of Financial Advice) Regulation 2014 
(Cth), reg 7.7A.7), but these regulations were subsequently disallowed by the Senate. A Bill to make 
similar amendments is currently before the Parliament; if passed, it would repeal both the opt-in fee 
disclosure obligation and the exemption: Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial 
Advice) Bill 2014 (Cth) sch 1, items 17, 21. 
47 Jillian Segal, ‘Institutional Self-regulation: What Should Be the Role of the Regulator?’ (Speech 
delivered at the National Institute for Governance Twilight Seminar, Canberra, 8 November 2001) 10 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1341128/NIGConf_081101.pdf>. More recently, ASIC has put 
forward the view that there is no need for a mandatory codes approval power in the Corporations Act: 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission to Financial System Inquiry, Treasury 
(Cth), April 2014, 116 [456]. 
48 ASIC has itself acknowledged that there are limited incentives to encourage businesses to seek ASIC 
approval of codes: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission to Financial System 
Inquiry, Treasury (Cth), April 2014, 116 [457]. 
49 ASIC has noted that it had received only one code approval application, however, the work has not 
substantially progressed due to the changes to the FoFA legislation: ibid 115 [452]. The Insurance 
Council of Australia had indicated that it intended to seek ASIC approval of its code: see Ian Enright, 
General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review 2012–2013 (Final Report, May 2013) 21 [4.1]. 
However, ASIC’s reference only to one code approval application, and that being made in the context of 
the FoFA obligations, suggests that, as at April 2014, an application for approval had not been made.  
50 Pearson also suggests that there has been a change in emphasis in ASIC’s codes approval policy from the 
idea of codes as a gap filler and elaborator to one of codes as setting higher standards: Pearson, Financial 
Services Law and Compliance in Australia, above n 22, 50. 
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C   An Example of Self-Regulation in Detail: The Code of Banking Practice 
The Banking Code is published by the ABA and it applies to consumer and 
small business customers and their guarantors, and, where relevant, to potential 
consumer and small business customers and guarantors.P817F51 P It applies to all of a 
subscribing bank’s ‘banking services’, including services supplied through an 
intermediary.P818F52P The 2013 Code includes general principles (such as a principle to 
treat customers fairly and to comply with the laws), as well as detailed rules 
setting out the obligations of subscriber banks in areas such as: 
• disclosure of fees, charges, and terms and conditions; 
• notification of changes to fees, charges, and terms and conditions; 
• disclosure of general information about banking services; 
• privacy and confidentiality; 
• statements of account; 
• direct debit and chargebacks; 
• credit assessment; 
• financial hardship; 
• debt collection; 
• complaint handling; 
• guarantors and co-borrowers; and 
• specific provisions for older people, people with a disability, and people 
in remote Indigenous communities. 
In contrast to some other financial services codes,P819F 53 P compliance with the 
Banking Code is incorporated into the terms and conditions of banking products, 
thus becoming part of the contract between a customer and a subscribing bank. P820F54 P 
Non-compliance with the Banking Code may then amount to a breach of 
contract, which could be pursued through the court system. P821F55 
                                                 
51 2013 Code cl 42 (definition of ‘you’).  
52 2013 Code cl 42 (definition of ‘banking service’). 
53 See, eg, the benchmarking table in Enright, above n 49, 37, showing that the General Insurance and 
National Insurance Brokers Association codes do not have legal status, while the Banking Code and 
Mutual Banking Code (now Customer Owned Banking Code) are terms of the contract. 
54 2013 Code cl 12.3. 
55 The ABA has explained that ‘[t]he Code of Banking Practice is a contract between customers and 
subscribing banks which means courts can review compliance with the code’: Australian Bankers’ 
Association, ‘Code of Banking Practice Works Well for Bank Customers – ABA Responds to Mr Wilkie 
Independent MP’ (Media Release, 21 August 2012) <http://www.bankers.asn.au/Media/Media-Releases/ 
Media-Release-2012/Code-of-Banking-Practice-works-well-for-bank-customers>. Note, however, that, as 
discussed below, the courts have not always taken a consistent approach to this argument about the 
enforceability of the Code. 
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Compliance with the Banking Code is monitored by the independent Code 
Compliance Monitoring Committee (‘CCMC’), which consists of an Independent 
Chairperson, a consumer and small business representative, and an industry 
representative.P822F56 P The CCMC’s functions include investigating and determining 
allegations of non-compliance and monitoring compliance with the Banking 
Code, including by conducting own motion inquiries.P823F57P In certain circumstances, 
the CCMC is empowered to name a bank for non-compliance,P824F58P but the CCMC 
has no powers to award compensation or redress to a customer if it has been 
found that the Banking Code has been breached. In contrast, the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (‘FOS’)P825F59P can award compensation or other redress to bank 
customers.P826F60P However, the role of FOS is to resolve particular disputes, and most 
disputes are resolved without FOS needing to make a decision setting out its 
views on the matter.P827F61 
Subscription to the Banking Code is open to all banks with a retail presence 
in Australia (whether or not they are also a member of the ABA), and as at the 
date of writing, 13 banking groups (representing 18 bank brands) are covered by 
the 2013 Code, including the four major banks,P828F62P and most (but not all) of the 
banks providing retail financial services in Australia.P829F63 
The early history of the Banking Code reflects an industry concern to 
determine the applicable standards itself, rather than support the draft code 
developed by a government taskforce.P830F 64 P Perhaps partly as a consequence, 
consumer advocates were highly critical of the 1993 Code, with one group 
suggesting in 2000 that the 1993 Code ‘fails banking consumers’.P831F65 
                                                 
56 2013 Code cl 36(a). 
57 2013 Code cl 36(b). See also Code Compliance Monitoring Committee, What We Do (2015) 
<http://www.ccmc.org.au/what-we-do/> for details of its activities. 
58 2013 Code cl 36(j). 
59 FOS is the ASIC-approved dispute resolution scheme to which all Banking Code members belong.  
60 Financial Ombudsman Service, Terms of Reference (at 1 January 2015) cl 9.1 (‘FOS Terms’). 
61 In 2013–14, only 9 per cent of disputes were resolved by FOS decision: Financial Ombudsman Service, 
Annual Review 2013–14 (2014) 48. For a discussion of the different roles of compliance monitoring and 
dispute resolution, see Code Compliance Monitoring Committee, Submission to the Review of the Code of 
Banking Practice (Submission Annexure C, 11 March 2008) 7–10.  
62  The four major banks are the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank, National 
Australia Bank and Westpac Banking Corporation.  
63 See Code Compliance Monitoring Committee, Code Subscribers (2015) <http://www.ccmc.org.au/the-
code/code-subscribers/>. Of the 26 ABA members, 18 are members of the Code of Banking Practice; two 
are members of the Customer Owned Banking Code. Arab Bank Australia, Defence Bank, and Members 
Equity Bank are some of the ABA members that offer retail financial services, but have not subscribed to 
the 2013 Code. Nor have these institutions subscribed to the Customer Owned Banking Code. 
64 See Richard Viney, ‘Review of The Code of Banking Practice’ (Issues Paper, RTV Consulting, 5 March 
2001) 1 <http://www.reviewbankcode.com> (‘Viney Review Issues Paper’). See also Weerasooria and 
Wallace, above n 8, 138–9. 
65 Australian Consumers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice Review – ACA Submission (Submission, 
July 2000) 3, quoted in Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 8.  
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This first review of the Banking Code was conducted by Mr Richard Viney, 
and took place between 2000 and 2001 (‘Viney Review’).P832F66P The reviewer agreed 
with many of the criticisms of the 1993 Code, and made significant 
recommendations for change. Most of these recommendations were accepted by 
the industry, and the result was the 2003 Code.P833F67 P This was later subject to some 
modifications, resulting in a May 2004 version.P834F68P The changes following from the 
Viney Review, including the implementation of a new regime for monitoring 
compliance, were welcomed by stakeholders including consumer advocates. For 
example, in a submission to the second review of the Banking Code, consumer 
advocates expressed a view that ‘the Code, as published in 2004, was a 
significant advance on the previous Code, and has provided significant benefits 
to consumers’.P835F69 
This second review was conducted by Ms Jan McClelland, and took place 
between 2007 and 2008 (‘McClelland Review’).P836F70 P As with the Viney Review, 
many of the recommendations of the McClelland Review were accepted by the 
ABA, and were implemented through the 2013 Code, which had a 
commencement date of 1 February 2014.P837F71 P The maturing of the Banking Code 
over its life, including through establishing an independent compliance 
monitoring body and setting standards that exceed those found in law, has 
resulted in the Banking Code now being generally supported by consumer 
advocates.P838F72P Consumer advocates, however, do remain critical of some aspects of 
the Banking Code; some of these criticisms are discussed further below. 
 
                                                 
66 Richard Viney, ‘Review of the Code of Banking Practice’ (Final Report, RTV Consulting, October 2001) 
<http://www.reviewbankcode.com> (‘Viney Review Final Report’). 
67  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (at August 2003) (‘2003 Code’). 
68  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (at May 2004) (‘2004 Modified Code’). 
69 Nicola Howell, Joint Consumer Submission to the Review of the Code of Banking Practice and the 
Review Issues Paper (Submission, 31 July 2008) 8 (‘Joint Consumer Submission’). 
70 Jan McClelland, ‘Review of the Code of Banking Practice’ (Final Report, Jan McClelland and 
Associates, December 2008) <http://www.reviewbankcode2.com.au> (‘McClelland Review Final 
Report’). 
71 For the current and earlier versions of the Banking Code, see Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of 
Banking Practice, above n 7. 
72 See, eg, National Information Centre on Retirement Investments, ‘Revised Code of Banking Practice 
Brings Improved Rights for Consumers’ (Media Release, 5 May 2013) 
<http://www.nicri.org.au/nicri/news/revised-code-of-banking-practice-brings-improved-rights-for-
consumers-2/>; Consumer Action Law Centre, ‘Revised Code of Banking Practice’ (Media Release, 31 
January 2013) <http://consumeraction.org.au/revised-code-of-banking-practice>; Financial Counselling 
Australia, ‘Banking Code Welcomed by Financial Counsellors’ (Media Release, 31 January 2013) 
<http://www.financialcounsellingaustralia.org.au/Corporate/News/Banking-Code-Welcomed-by-
Financial-Counsellors/>. 
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D   The Financial System Inquiry’s View of Self-Regulation and  
Co-Regulation 
As noted above, the terms of reference for the FSI did not specifically 
reference self-regulation or co-regulation, and this form of regulation was given 
limited attention in the FSI’s interim report, released in July 2014.P839F73P Instead, the 
FSI Interim Report sought comments on the role that industry self-regulation 
could play in improving customer outcomes generally. P840F74P  
However, the FSI Final Report explicitly acknowledged the relevance of 
self-regulation in the financial services sector, noting in its overview that both 
regulatory and self-regulatory changes were needed to strengthen firm 
accountability, particularly in the areas of disclosure and financial advice.P841F75 P  
In terms of the scope of the role for self-regulation, the FSI suggested that 
self-regulation was ‘more successful in setting governance, customer service or 
technical standards that supplement the law, than in addressing sector-wide 
conduct issues’.P842F 76 P Consistent with this view, the FSI explicitly rejected a 
suggestion that self-regulation alone could be an appropriate mechanism for 
improving the design and distribution of products for consumers.P843F77P In particular, 
the FSI noted that existing industry-led standards had not been sufficient to 
address serious conduct issues in the financial advice sector.P844F78P However, the FSI 
suggested that self-regulation could play an important role in some areas, 
including as a mechanism for facilitating innovative and improved disclosure 
(particularly disclosure of risks and fees),P845F79 P improved guidance and disclosure  
for general insurance,P846F80P and for raising industry standards generally.P847F81P The FSI 
focused on the role of self-regulation at a high level; with one or two exemptions, 
the FSI declined to make specific suggestions for change to existing self-
regulatory or co-regulatory arrangementsP848F82P or to the legislative accommodation of 
self-regulation and co-regulation.P849F83P  
                                                 
73  Financial System Inquiry, Treasury (Cth), Financial System Inquiry Interim Report (15 July 2014) (‘FSI 
Interim Report’). 
74 Ibid 3–87. 
75 FSI Final Report, above n 1, xx. 
76 Ibid 194. 
77 Ibid 204. Instead, the FSI recommended amending the law to introduce a principles-based product design 
and distribution obligation: ibid 198 recommendation 21. 
78 Ibid 204. 
79 Ibid 215–6. 
80 Ibid 194, 230. 
81 Ibid 220. 
82 Exceptions include recommendations that the ePayments Code be made mandatory: ibid 161 
recommendation 16; and that industry should be encouraged to ‘develop standards on the use of non-
monetary default covenants’: at 264 recommendation 34. On this latter recommendation, the text of the 
report specifically referred to the need for adjustments to the Code of Banking Practice and Customer 
Owned Banking Code: at 264. 
83 The FSI explained that it ‘has not suggested changes to current arrangements that are generally working 
well, such as alternative dispute resolution systems’: ibid 193–4.  
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III   ANALYSING THE CODE OF BANKING PRACTICE 
The preceding discussion provided a brief overview of the integration of self-
regulation in general, and industry codes in particular, into the Australian 
regulatory framework for financial services, as well as an overview of the scope 
and operation of the Banking Code. In the main Part of this article, some of the 
policy issues covered by the Banking Code, and any parallel developments with 
legislation, are analysed. This illustrates the different ways in which self-
regulation can contribute to the development of consumer protection standards 
for members of a particular self-regulatory instrument, and to the industry more 
broadly. In particular, this Part focuses on various gaps and overlaps between the 
Banking Code and legislation; these are summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Some Gaps and Overlaps between the Banking Code and Legislation 




Location of the higher or 
more detailed standard 
Disclosure of fees, charges, and 
terms and conditions 
Yes Yes Legislation 
Access to internal and external 
dispute resolution 
Yes Yes Legislation 
Responsible lending Yes Yes Legislation 
Reverse mortgages  No Yes Legislation 
Unfair contract terms No Yes Legislation 
Account switching No No ePayments Code 
Account combination, accepting co-
debtors, and liability for subsidiary 
cards 
Yes No Banking Code 
Agreements and guidelines 
otherwise unenforceable by 
consumers 
Yes No Banking Code 
Specific obligations for low income 
and Indigenous customers  
Yes No Banking Code 
Aspirational standards Yes No Banking Code 
Protection for small business 
borrowers 
Yes No Banking Code 
Protection for third party guarantors Yes Yes Banking Code 
Financial hardship Yes Yes Banking Code 
 
A   Banking Code Obligations Now Superseded by Legislation 
As indicated above, there are a number of key clauses in the 2013 Code that 
have now largely been superseded by legislation. These clauses were originally at 
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the vanguard of consumer protection for deposit-taking and consumer credit 
services, and the policy issues they cover include disclosure of the terms of the 
service, dispute resolution, and credit assessment (or responsible lending). In 
these areas, the original and later iterations of the Banking Code imposed 
standards on its subscribers that exceeded those imposed by law. Similarly, 
higher standards were imposed on credit unions, building societies, and mutual 
banks by the 1996 Credit Union Code of Practice and Building Society Code of 
Practice,P850F84P which have now both been replaced by the Customer Owned Banking 
Code. However, with considerable legislative change over the recent past, the 
relevant provisions in the legislation now mirror or exceed the standards in the 
Banking Code.  
 
1 Disclosure of Terms and Conditions, Fees and Charges, and Other Matters 
A large part of the 1993 Code focused on disclosure obligations, including 
disclosure obligations at point of sale, at the time of contract, and during the life 
of the contract.P851F85 P Such obligations seem quite unexceptional now, particularly 
given the rise of disclosure as a consumer protection tool.P852F86P However, as noted in 
the Viney Review, in 1993 ‘there were no Federal or State laws requiring 
detailed disclosure of non-credit banking products or services’.P853F 87 P Disclosure 
obligations were not completely absent. There were disclosure obligations 
contained in the voluntary Recommended Procedures To Govern the 
Relationship between the Users and Providers of EFT Systems, P854F88P but these did 
not cover all banking services. There was also some regulation of disclosure (and 
other matters) in relation to consumer credit products in some of the states and 
territories; however it was not consistent. Jeremy Mitchell has suggested that the 
Banking Code in the United Kingdom (first published in 1992) was ‘a public 
codification of banking practice’; consumers were no longer in ignorance of 
normal banking practice.P855F89P In Australia, however, the 1993 Code did more than 
publicly codify existing practice. By introducing explicit disclosure obligations 
for customers and potential customers of Banking Code subscribers, the 1993 
                                                 
84 Unfortunately, the original Credit Union Code of Practice and Building Society Code of Practice do not 
seem to be available online. However, data presented in the annual (to 2003) monitoring reports of these 
codes suggests that these codes were similar in content to the 1993 Code: see, eg, Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, ‘Compliance with the Payments System Codes of Practice and the EFT 
Code of Conduct (April 2002 to March 2003)’ (Report No 27, December 2003) <http://download. 
asic.gov.au/media/1327292/Code_Monitoring_Report_02_03.pdf>. 
85 See 1993 Code pt A.  
86 Contra recent criticisms about the effectiveness of disclosure as a regulatory tool: Productivity 
Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ (Inquiry Report No 45, 30 April 
2008) vol 2, 260–2; FSI Interim Report, above n 73, 3-56–3-58. 
87 Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 42. 
88 Subsequently replaced by the Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct, and then the ePayments Code.  
89 Jeremy Mitchell, ‘Policy and Practice in the United Kingdom’ (1999) 23 Journal of Consumer Studies 
and Home Economics 129, 135. 
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Code brought significant improvements in the consumer protection standards in 
banking.  
However, following the 1996–97 Financial System Inquiry, more expansive 
point of sale and continuing product disclosure obligations were imposed upon 
all financial institutions offering deposit products through the FSRA.P856F90P Further, 
soon after the 1993 Code came into effect, nationally consistent disclosure 
obligations for consumer credit products were imposed through the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code (‘UCCC’),P857F91 P and since 2010, through the NCCPA.P858F92 
Thus, the disclosure obligations in the Banking Code have largely been 
superseded by legislative developments, with the standards applicable to all 
relevant financial services providers, whether or not they subscribe to the 
Banking Code. These developments were explicitly recognised in the two 
independent reviews of the Banking Code,P859F93P and the Viney Review in particular 
included a detailed discussion of ways to minimise duplication and reduce 
inconsistencies between disclosure obligations in the Banking Code and those in 
the legislation.P860F94P  
 
2 Access to Internal and External Dispute Resolution Processes 
The 1993 Code introduced an obligation for subscribing banks to provide 
access (at no charge) to internal complaints handling and external dispute 
resolution processes.P861F95P At the time this was not an issue covered by legislation. 
The then Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman (‘ABIO’) – now FOS – had 
been established three years earlier, as one of the banking sector’s early forays 
into self-regulation. The close connection between self-regulation expressed 
through the dispute resolution scheme, and self-regulation expressed through the 
Banking Code, was later mirrored in other parts of the financial services sectorP862F96 P 
and continues to this day.P863F97P  
                                                 
90 Now in Corporations Act pt 7.9.  
91 Template legislation was enacted in Queensland and mirrored in all states and territories: Consumer 
Credit (Queensland) Act 1994 (Qld). This legislation was subsequently repealed by Credit 
(Commonwealth Powers) Act 2010 (Qld) s 11. 
92 Point of sale and ongoing disclosure obligations have also been included in the functional ePayments 
Code (replacing the former Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct), which is administered by ASIC. 
93 Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 42–3; Jan McClelland, ‘Review of Code of Banking Practice’ 
(Issues Paper, Jan McClelland and Associates, May 2008) 16, 18 <http://www.reviewbankcode2.com.au> 
(‘McClelland Review Issues Paper’). 
94 Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 42–61.  
95 1993 Code cl 20. 
96 See, eg, General Insurance Code cl 10, which requires insurers to provide access to internal and external 
dispute resolution processes. The Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Ltd (later merged with other 
schemes to form FOS) was established in 1993 to administer the General Insurance Enquiries and 
Complaints Scheme which had commenced in 1991: see Alison Maynard, ‘General Insurance Enquiries 
and Complaints Scheme’ (1999) 1(8) ADR Bulletin 107. 
97 2013 Code cl 38. 
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The introduction of both formal processes within banks, and independent 
EDR schemes, have greatly improved the ability of consumers (and small 
businesses) to have their complaints considered and resolved in a cost-effective, 
relatively consumer friendly way, without needing to access the court system. 
For example, in 2012–13, FOS received 32 307 disputes from consumers and 
small businesses,P864F98P including 11 469 accepted disputes about banks.P865F99P In contrast, 
in 2012–13, there were 70 consumer law applications filed in the Federal Circuit 
Court,P866F100P and 187 consumer law matters filed in the Federal Court.P867F101P However, 
these are not disaggregated by respondent type, and it is possible that only a 
small percentage of these matters involve banks. As Griffiths and Mitchell have 
noted, ‘[t]here is little doubt that FOS represents a significant privatisation of 
dispute resolution which would otherwise proceed through the court system’. P868F102 
As discussed above, the EDR schemes are formally recognised in the 
regulatory framework, and membership of an approved scheme has been made 
compulsory for Banking Code subscribers and non-subscribers alike. The 
standards and approval criteria set out in the regulations P869F103P and ASIC Regulatory 
GuidesP870F104P mirror or exceed the standards set in the Banking Code, making the 
legislation (and supporting ASIC guidance) now the primary vehicle for setting 
the standards for complaints handling and dispute resolution. 
 
3 Responsible Lending 
At the time of the 1993 Code, there was no law imposing a positive 
obligation on banks or other lenders to lend responsibly. The 1993 Code imposed 
a credit assessment obligation on banks for the first time, although the form of 
the obligation was strongly criticised by consumer advocates in the Viney 
Review. They argued that the provision did not 
set any specific standards at all. (As currently worded, the language of the clause 
is more or less wholly discretionary. At best, it can be said to require that some 
                                                 
98 Financial Ombudsmen Service, 2012–13 Annual Review (2013) 47. 
99 Ibid 54. 
100 Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Federal Circuit Court of Australia Annual Report 2012–13 (2013) 4. 
101 Federal Court of Australia, Federal Court of Australia Annual Report 2012–13 (2013) 150. Note that 
there were 3849 matters filed in the Federal Court of Australia in relation to the Corporations Act and 
ASIC Act (which includes consumer and investor protection): at 149. However, there is no disaggregation 
of the applications further, such as between the investor or consumer protection matters and other 
Corporations Act matters. The summary of the work in this jurisdiction makes no reference to the parts of 
the Corporations Act and ASIC Act relevant to investor protection (with the exception of fundraising) or 
consumer protection, suggesting that they do not play a large role in the Court’s jurisdiction here: at 21. 
102 Tim Griffiths and Jacqui Mitchell, ‘Financial Ombudsman Service: Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde?’ (2012) 27(9) 
Australian Insurance Law Bulletin 130, 131. 
103 See Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) regs 7.6.02(1) (internal dispute resolution), (3) (external 
dispute resolution); National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 10(4). 
104 ASIC RG139; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 165 – Licensing: 
Internal and External Dispute Resolution (at 13 June 2013). 
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form of assessment be undertaken before credit is provided; however, the form of 
assessment is left entirely to the Subscriber.) P871F105 
After the release of the 1993 Code, there were some other developments in 
relation to responsible lending. The then Australian Banking Industry 
Ombudsman published a number of guidelines on maladministration in lending, 
initially focusing on housing, investment and small business loans,P872F106 P but later 
publications also covered maladministration in credit card limits.P873F107 P In 1996, the 
UCCC came into force, and it allowed for courts or tribunals to ‘reopen’ unjust 
transactions.P874F 108 P One of the factors that could be considered in determining 
whether a transaction was unjust was ‘whether … the credit provider knew, or 
could have ascertained by reasonable inquiry of the debtor at the time, that the 
debtor could not pay in accordance with its terms or not without substantial 
hardship’.P875F109P However, this was only one of a number of factors that could be 
taken into account by a court or tribunal,P876F110P and its existence did not necessarily 
act as a brake on all instances of irresponsible lending.P877F111 P The 2003 Code and 
2004 Modified Code included a strengthened credit assessment obligation,P878F112P and 
further detailed improvements were recommended in the McClelland Review.P879F113 P 
However, in the end, only minor changes were made, so that there is little 
significant difference between the relevant provisions in the 2013 Code, and the 
2003 Code and 2004 Modified Code.P880F114 P  
The fact that there were only limited changes made following the McClelland 
Review is likely to have been due to the imposition of responsible lending 
                                                 
105 Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) et al, Joint Consumer Submission to the Banking Code of Practice 
Review (Submission, September 2000) 29, quoted in Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 71. 
106 Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 72. 
107 Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman, ‘Credit Card Limits and Maladministration’ (Bulletin No 
45, March 2005) <www.fos.org.au/custom/files/docs/fos_banking_finance_bulletin_45.pdf>. 
108 UCCC s 70. 
109 UCCC s 70(2)(l). A similar provision is now found in the NCC s 76(2)(l). 
110  There were 15 separate factors listed in UCCC s 70(2). 
111 One example of where the provision did not assist is discussed in Nicola Howell, ‘Preventing Consumer 
Credit Over-commitment and Irresponsible Lending in Australia’ in Geraint Howells et al (eds), 
Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007 (Ashgate Publishing, 2007) 387, 388. See also Jessica Tuffin 
‘Responsible Lending Laws: Essential Development or Overreaction?’ (2009) 9 QUT Law & Justice 
Journal 280, 289–93 for a criticism of the UCCC provisions and other statutory and equitable principles 
that have been considered in relation to cases of irresponsible lending. 
112 2003 Code cl 25.1; 2004 Modified Code cl 25.1. 
113 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 12–13.  
114 Cf 2013 Code cl 27. 
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obligations in the NCCPA.P881F115 P The NCCPA requires credit providers and credit 
assistance providers to make an assessment that a particular credit proposal is not 
unsuitable for a particular consumer,P882F 116 P and the provisions are much more 
expansive than what is contained in the 2013 Code. For example, under the 
NCCPA, credit businesses are required to make certain inquiries and take 
reasonable steps to verify information before making a suitability assessment.P883F117 P 
The NCCPA also sets out the circumstances in which a credit contract is 
presumed to be unsuitable.P884F118P Further, the responsible lending obligations apply 
to all licensed credit providers and credit assistance providers, whether or not the 
licensee is also a subscriber to the Banking Code or another industry code. 
Finally, there are also specific responsible lending assumptions and obligations 
for small amount credit contracts,P885F119 P reverse mortgages,P886F120P and credit cards.P887F121 
The standards that are set in the legislation are far more extensive than those 
found in the Banking Code, and it is the legislation, rather than the Banking 
Code, that now primarily sets the standards for responsible lending.P888F122 
 
4 Other Policy Issues 
The McClelland Review also made a number of recommendations for 
provisions in the Banking Code to deal with new policy issues, but these were 
never implemented because similar or more expansive provisions were 
introduced through other regulatory instruments before the 2013 Code was 
finalised. Examples of this include: 
• recommendations for new provisions in the Banking Code to address 
concerns with reverse mortgages and unsolicited credit card limit 
offersP889F 123 P were instead addressed in the 2011 amendments to the 
NCCPA; P890F124P  
                                                 
115 In its response to the McClelland Review recommendations, the ABA noted that there needed to be 
consistency between the Banking Code and the then proposed legislative requirements for responsible 
lending, and that ‘[t]he final wording of changes to clause 25.1 for consumer lending will be developed in 
line with the final consumer credit legislation’: Australian Bankers’ Association, Review of the Code of 
Banking Practice – Response by the Australian Bankers’ Association to Review Final Recommendations 
(September 2009) <http://www.bankers.asn.au/Industry-Standards/ABAs-Code-of-Banking-Practice/ 
Review-of-the-Code-of-Banking-Practice-Response-by-Australian-Bankers--Association-to--Review-
Final-Recommendations> (‘Response to McClelland Review’). 
116 NCCPA ss 128, 152.  
117 See, eg, NCCPA s 130. 
118 See, eg, NCCPA s 131.  
119 NCCPA pt 3-2C. 
120 NCCPA pt 3-2D. 
121 NCCPA pt 3-2B. 
122 Another important area where legislative change has resulted in practical redundancy of the Banking 
Code is in relation to privacy protections: cf 2013 Code cl 24 with the extensive privacy obligations 
imposed on private sector businesses, including banks, under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
123 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 13 (credit cards), 17 (reverse mortgages).  
124 NCCPA pt 3-2D (reverse mortgages), pt 3-2B div 4 (credit cards).  
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• a recommendation that the issue of including unfair contract terms 
protections in the Banking Code be considered in the context of  
the proposed national regulation of consumer creditP891F 125 P was rendered 
obsolete by the introduction of a prohibition against unfair terms in 
consumer contracts in part 2-3 of the Australian Consumer LawP892F126P and 
corresponding provisions in the ASIC Act;P893F127P and 
• a recommendation to include in the Banking Code provisions on account 
switchingP894F128 P was ultimately addressed in the functionally based (rather 
than industry-based) ePayments Code.P895F129 
This summary demonstrates that in the key policy issues of disclosure, access 
to dispute resolution services, and responsible lending, among others, the 
provisions in the Banking Code preceded legislation. However, the Banking 
Code provisions have now largely been rendered redundant. It is now the 
legislation (supported by regulations and relevant ASIC Regulatory Guides) that 
sets the highest and generally most comprehensive standards.  
From a consumer perspective, this is welcome, as it makes standards 
uniformly applicable to financial services businesses, and increases the potential 
consequences for non-compliance.P896F130P However, it might also be argued that this 
means that the Banking Code no longer has a key role in setting and improving 
banking standards. The remainder of the Part will refute this suggestion with 
reference to a number of areas that demonstrate the Banking Code’s continued 
relevance.  
 
B   Some Examples of Continued Relevance of the Banking Code 
Despite some key clauses in the Banking Code having become largely 
redundant, there are a number of reasons to be confident about the continued 
relevance of the Banking Code in setting and improving banking standards. 
These are discussed below. 
 
1 Providing Consumer Rights in Areas Not Covered by Legislation 
First, the Banking Code covers important policy issues that are not addressed 
by legislation, and/or where legislation is unlikely to play a role.  
                                                 
125 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 95 recommendation 72. 
126  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’). 
127 ASIC Act pt 2 div 2 sub-div BA. 
128 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 77 recommendations 28–30. 
129 ePayments Code cl 35.  
130 Compare the (only) sanction for non-compliance with the Code that can be imposed by the CCMC (a 
naming sanction, see 2013 Code cl 36(j)) with the enforcement options, sanctions and remedies available 
to ASIC and affected consumers in the event of non-compliance with the obligations in the ASIC Act (eg, 
pt 2 div 2 sub-divs G, GB, GC), NCCPA (eg, pts 2-4, 4-1, 4-2), or Corporations Act (eg, pt 7.6 div 8; pt 
7.9 div 7; pt 7.10 div 2).  
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For some policy issues, the 2013 Code provides specific protections, where 
no similar protections are found in legislation. For example, the 2013 Code 
includes rules on when banks can combine accounts,P897F 131 P the circumstances in 
which banks will accept customers as co-debtors,P898F132P and liability for subsidiary 
cardsP899F133P that are not provided elsewhere in the legislative framework.  
Another area in which legislation does not play a role is in relation to various 
agreements, arrangements and guidelines that affect, or have the potential to 
affect, the banker–customer relationship, but where customers are not able to 
directly enforce the document and/or where the document is not easily accessible 
to customers. The role of the Banking Code here is to increase the enforceability 
and visibility of these agreements and arrangements for consumers and small 
businesses, and provide a direct avenue for complaint in the event that the 
relevant Code provisions are not complied with.  
For example, the 2013 Code includes rules on chargebacksP900F134P which reflect 
aspects of contracts between banks and card issuers (Visa and MasterCard). 
These contracts are not publicly available. Even if they were publicly available, 
bank customers are not party to these contracts, and would not be able to directly 
enforce the contracts.P901F 135 P The 2013 Code also includes rules on direct debits, 
which reflect the Bulk Electronic Clearing System Rules (‘BECS Rules’).P902F 136 P 
Although the BECS Rules are publicly available through the website of the 
Australian Payments Clearing Association (‘APCA’), they are very technical and 
are not written in a consumer friendly language or structure.P903F 137 P Nor do bank 
customers have any direct rights under the BECS Rules in the event of non-
compliance.  
Similarly, the 2013 Code provides enforceability for guidelines and other 
documents that are not otherwise binding on banks. For example, the 2013 Code 
includes clauses that require subscribing banks to comply with the ACCC/ASIC 
Debt Collection Guideline,P904F138P and the ABA’s protocol on branch closures.P905F139 P In 
addition, the 2013 Code obliges individual subscribing banks to develop their 
                                                 
131 2013 Code cl 19. 
132 2013 Code cl 29. 
133 2013 Code cl 30. 
134  See, eg, 2013 Code cl 22. 
135 See Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman, Submission of the Australian Banking Industry 
Ombudsman to the Review of the Code of Banking Practice (Submission, July 2000) 3–6, quoted in Viney 
Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 83–5. 
136 See Australian Payment Clearing Association, Procedures for Bulk Electronic Clearing System 
Framework (CS2) (at 1 July 2014) pt 7.  
137 Note that APCA does include some fact sheets and guidelines on its website about the direct entry system 
for payments, however, they are provided to ‘help businesses with establishing and processing direct 
debits’, rather than to provide consumers with information on their rights: Australian Payments Clearing 
Association, Direct Entry (2002) <http://www.apca.com.au/payment-systems/direct-entry>. 
138 2013 Code cl 32. Note the Code also requires subscribing banks to only sell debts to third parties that 
agree to comply with these guidelines: 2013 Code cl 32.2. 
139 2013 Code cl 34. 
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own guidelines for dealing with assets and debts being considered in family law 
proceedings, and to publish and comply with those guidelines.P906F140P Here, there is 
not a consistency of standards required, but simply a requirement to develop and 
publish guidelines against which performance can be measured and compliance 
monitored. The Banking Code then imposes an obligation on banks to comply 
with guidelines developed either outside the industry or from within the 
industry.P907F141P Again, this gives bank customers direct rights in the event of non-
compliance with those guidelines. 
The 2013 Code also addresses important policy questions that may be 
difficult to formulate as legal obligations, in the light of the attendant 
enforcement and regulatory consequences of contravening legislative obligations. 
This may be the case for some obligations that may have social justice and/or 
welfare considerations as their main driver, and where codes may be a more 
appropriate vehicle than legislation.P908F142P For example, in the Banking Code context, 
it is perhaps more difficult to see how the obligations in relation to low income 
customersP909F 143 P and Indigenous customers in remote communitiesP910F 144 P might be 
effectively incorporated into a legislative instrument which requires certainty of 
definitions and non-discrimination.  
Finally, the 2013 Code imposes aspirational standards upon industry 
members. These aspirational standards are important, particularly if the Code has 
(or hopes to have) an impact on reputation, and provides (or hopes to provide) 
customers with a reason to do business with Banking Code members in 
preference to businesses that are not members.P911F145P However, such standards can 
perhaps be of a nature or type that may make them either less amenable to 
imposition through legislation, or inappropriate for imposition through 
legislation, for example, because the standards may not be easily defined, and 
                                                 
140 2013 Code cl 40. 
141 More recently, the ABA has released guidelines on ‘Protecting Vulnerable Consumers from Potential 
Financial Abuse’ and ‘Promoting Understanding about Banks’ Financial Hardship programs’: Australian 
Bankers’ Association, Protecting Vulnerable Consumers from Potential Financial Abuse (Industry 
Guideline, June 2013); Australian Bankers’ Association, Promoting Understanding about Banks’ 
Financial Hardship Programs (Industry Guideline, May 2013). See generally Australian Bankers’ 
Association, Industry Standards (2011) <http://www.bankers.asn.au/Consumers/Industry-Standards>. 
These guidelines have not been incorporated into the Banking Code, but perhaps a future iteration of the 
Code will see such inclusion.  
142 Here, I am not arguing that it will always or even usually be inappropriate to address social justice or 
welfare considerations through consumer protection regulation. In contrast, the Productivity Commission 
has suggested that retail price regulation in competitive markets is not the best way to respond to the need 
of low income customers for assistance to pay for utility services: Productivity Commission, above n 86, 
vol 2, 114–15. 
143 2013 Code cl 16.  
144 2013 Code cl 8. 
145 This is purported to be one of the incentives for subscribing to an industry code, although in practice, it is 
not clear that Code membership is heavily promoted by banks, or even promoted by consumer 
organisations and/or regulators as a criteria to consider when choosing a bank or bank product/service. 
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may be highly subjective and context dependent. In the Banking Code context, 
this arguably includes commitments to ‘provid[e] effective disclosure of 
information’,P912F146P ‘provide information to you in plain language’, P913F147P ‘communicate 
with you and/or your representatives in a timely and responsible manner’,P914F148P and 
‘act fairly and reasonably towards you in a consistent and ethical manner’.P915F149P  
The inclusion of more aspirational standards in a voluntary code does, 
however, introduce a considerable tension in relation to enforceability. To what 
extent can, or should, Code members be held to such aspirational standards given 
the fact that there may not be widespread agreement on what the standard 
requires, either overall, or in the context of a particular dispute with a particular 
customer? For example, something that is ‘effective disclosure of information’ 
for one customer or group of customers may be considerably less effective for 
another customer or group of customers.P916F150 P  
In the Banking Code, this tension between the value of aspirational status and 
the importance of enforceability has arisen in the context of the ‘fairness’ 
commitment.P917F151 P In its submission to the McClelland Review, the ABA argued 
that the key commitments, including the fairness commitment, ‘do [not] 
necessarily lend themselves to narrow legalistic interpretation as the terms of a 
contract are interpreted’, and that they are ‘difficult to measure and therefore 
uncertain’.P918F 152 P The ABA supported inclusion of the key commitments in the 
revised Code, but as ‘theme principles that are separate from the stricter, 
enforceable provisions of the Code’.P919F153P The reviewer agreed, and also noted that 
the need for the ‘fairness’ clause as a type of fallback position would be lessened 
if recommendations for more detailed provisions on financial hardship and  
other matters were introduced into the Banking Code.P920F154P The McClelland Review 
therefore recommended retention of the key commitments, but with the proviso 
that the CCMC’s compliance monitoring, investigation, and reporting  
                                                 
146 2013 Code cl 3.1(b)(i). 
147 2013 Code cl 3.1(d). 
148 2013 Code cl 3.1(e). 
149 2013 Code cl 3.2. 
150 See, eg, the discussion of the ‘fairness’ standard in the United Kingdom’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ 
initiative: David T Llewellyn, ‘Trust and Confidence in Financial Services: A Strategic Challenge’ (2005) 
13 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 333, 334–5. 
151 2013 Code cl 3.2. It has also been considered in the context of the ‘compliance with the laws’ 
commitment: cl 4, however, the issue there is not so much that the standard is aspirational, and thus not 
amenable to precise definition, but that enforcing compliance with such a standard would require the 
CCMC to have detailed knowledge of, report on, and investigate compliance with, the vast range of laws 
that are imposed upon banks: see McClelland Review Issues Paper, above n 93, 73; Code Compliance 
Monitoring Committee, Submission to the Review of the Code of Banking Practice (Submission 
Annexure D, 11 March 2008) 5.  
152 Australian Bankers’ Association, Review of Code of Banking Practice (Submission Letter, 30 April 2008) 
3.  
153 Ibid 4. 
154 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 83.  
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functions would only extend to these key commitments if there was also a breach 
of another provision of the Banking Code.P921F 155 P This recommendation has been 
implemented in the 2013 Code.P922F156 
However, in this context, it is worth noting that a standard of ‘fairness’ is not 
necessarily so uncertain. Fairness as a procedural standard is well established. 
For example, in making decisions, FOS will do ‘what in its opinion is fair in all 
the circumstances’.P923F157P Fairness as a substantive standard has been introduced into 
consumer law in Australia in recent times, for example, through the introduction 
of national unfair contract terms legislation in the Australian Consumer Law.P924F158 P It 
is also present in other jurisdictions, for example, in the United Kingdom, where 
the high level and enforceable principles for financial services businesses include 
principle 6: ‘A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly’.P925F 159 P Thus, there is a strong argument that banks should be held 
accountable on the fairness commitment, as they are for the other commitments 
and rules in the Banking Code. While such an approach might require the CCMC 
to provide guidance as to how it will interpret the fairness commitment, the 
CCMC has commenced providing guidance on other aspects of its jurisdiction.P926F160 P 
                                                 
155 Ibid 84. 
156 2013 Code cl 36(b)(iii). Another issue that is not specifically resolved by the final wording chosen in the 
Code is that, while the CCMC may be restricted from reporting, monitoring, or investigating the key 
commitments, this may not preclude a court providing a remedy for a breach of a key commitment, as a 
breach of contract. 
157 FOS Terms cl 8.2. See also discussion in Australian Bankers’ Association, Review of the Banking Code of 
Practice – Submission in Response to Interim Recommendations and Other Issues (Submission, 6 August 
2008) 29. 
158 Australian Consumer Law pt 2-3; see also ASIC Act pt 2 div 2 sub-div BA. 
159 Financial Conduct Authority (UK), Handbook (at 1 April 2013), PRIN 2.1.1 principle 6. This principle 
requires attention to both substantive (eg, product design) and procedural (eg, marketing) matters: see, eg, 
the six ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ consumer outcomes as set out in Financial Services Authority (UK), 
Treating Customers Fairly – Towards Fair Outcomes for Consumers (Publication, July 2006) 3 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf>. These six outcomes remain relevant to 
the Financial Conduct Authority’s work: see, eg, Financial Conduct Authority (UK), Treating Customers 
Fairly (3 March 2015) <http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-
treatment-of-customers>. 
160 The CCMC has released guidance notes on, among other things, its discretion to investigate a matter: 
Code Compliance Monitoring Committee, ‘CCMC Compliance Investigations – Discretion (Mandate 
Clause 6.3)’ (Guidance Note No 2, August 2013); and its approach to the 12 month rule: Code 
Compliance Monitoring Committee, ‘CCMC Compliance Investigations – The 12 Month Rule (Mandate 
Clause 6.2)’ (Guidance Note No 3, August 2013). Copies of all CCMC Guidance Notes are available at 
Code Compliance Monitoring Committee, CCMC Guidance Notes (2015) <http://www.ccmc.org.au/ 
what-we-do/ccmc-guidance-notes/>. 
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There are also examples of guidance on fairness in other settings P927F161P and in other 
jurisdictions.P928F162 
 
2 Covering the Gaps in Applicability of Legislative Rules  
Secondly, on some policy issues, the Banking Code compensates (at least in 
part) for gaps in the applicability of legislative rules, and thus provides some 
protection in relation to a particular policy area for customer groups and/or 
products to whom the legislative protection does not extend. This role is 
particularly important for small business customers accessing finance, as the 
protections in the NCCPA and NCC apply only when the debtor is a natural 
person (or strata corporation), and where the credit is provided, or intended to be 
provided, wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household purposes 
or for residential investment purposes.P929F163 P As a result, small business customers do 
not receive the protections under the NCC and NCCPA. In addition, individuals 
who provide a guarantee or a mortgage to secure a small business loan are not 
protected under the NCCPA or NCC, even where the individual may be providing 
the guarantee to a family member or friend.P930F164P A proposal to amend the NCCPA 
to, among other things, extend limited responsible lending obligations to small 
businesses was released for consultation in late 2012,P931F165P but no legislation on this 
point has been tabled in Parliament. At the time of writing, the current Australian 
government is consulting on a proposal to extend unfair contract terms protection 
to small businesses,P932F 166 P but it has not announced any proposals to extend 
responsible lending obligations to small businesses.  
                                                 
161 ASIC has released guidance on whether a contract term imposing an early termination fee for residential 
loans would be considered an unfair term under the prohibition against unfair terms in the ASIC Act: 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 220 – Early Termination Fees for 
Residential Loans: Unconscionable Fees and Unfair Contract Terms (at 31 August 2011). 
162 See, eg, the various guidance documents produced by the former Financial Services Authority in the UK 
in relation to the ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ initiative, including: Financial Services Authority (UK), 
Treating Customers Fairly – Towards Fair Outcomes for Consumers, above n 159; Financial Services 
Authority (UK), Treating Customers Fairly – Culture (Publication, July 2007) 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-tcf-culture.pdf>; Financial Services Authority (UK), 
Treating Customers Fairly – Guide to Management Information (Publication, July 2007) 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/fca-tcf-mi-july2007.pdf>.  
163 NCC s 5(1). Also, a charge must be made for providing the credit, and the credit provider must provide 
the credit in the course of carrying on a business in Australia. A similar criterion was used in the NCC’s 
predecessor, the UCCC: see UCCC s 6(1). 
164 See discussion in relation to coverage under the UCCC: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Guaranteeing Someone Else’s Debts, Report No 107 (2006) 28–30. The same principle applies in relation 
to the NCC.  
165 See the exposure draft of the National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Credit Reform Phase 2) 
Bill 2012 (Cth) sch 2. 
166 Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ), ‘Extending Unfair Contract Term Protections to 
Small Businesses’ (Consultation Paper, Treasury (Cth), May 2014) <http://www.treasury.gov.au/ 
ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations>. 
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In contrast, the Banking Code has applied to small business customers since 
2003.P933F167 P As a result, small businesses (and guarantors of small business loans) are 
protected by the Banking Code provisions that deal with disclosure (in relation to 
both credit products and deposit products), financial hardship, credit assessment, 
and third party guarantors and mortgagors, even when they are not protected by 
the legislative provisions on the same topic. While there has been a gradual move 
towards legislative recognition that small business customers face many of the 
same challenges as, and deserve similar protections to, consumers,P934F168P the Banking 
Code has been able to provide protection to small businesses on issues where the 
legislation does not (or does not yet) provide coverage. 
Similarly, the obligations imposed by legislation do not necessarily apply to 
all products offered by banks. For example, some of the disclosure obligations 
and best interests duty in chapter 7 of the Corporations Act do not apply to, or 
are modified in their application to, ‘basic deposit products’ and other simpler 
banking products.P935F169P However, the 2013 Code is not so restricted, and extends to 
all of the products and services provided by banks to consumers and small 
businesses.P936F170P  
 
3 Giving Body to General Legislative Obligations 
Thirdly, the Banking Code can play a role in providing body or detail for 
consumer protection obligations that are framed in broad terms. The potential for 
this role was discussed in the context of disclosure and the implementation of the 
financial services reform (‘FSR’) proposals.P937F171 P However, in the Viney Review, 
the reviewer took the view that ‘[t]he Code is not the appropriate medium for 
fleshing out the necessary detail of PDS [product disclosure statements] for the 
                                                 
167 A small business is defined as a business with less than 100 full time equivalent people (if it is a 
manufacturing business), or less than 20 full-time equivalent people (in the case of other businesses): 
2013 Code cl 42 (definition of ‘small business’); 2003 Code cl 40 (definition of ‘small business’). 
168 See, eg, the introduction of a statutory prohibition against unconscionable conduct directed at small 
businesses in the (former) Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AC. In a further development of this trend, 
the unconscionability provisions in the Australian Consumer Law ss 21–2 no longer distinguish between 
consumer and business unconscionability. 
169 For the exemption from the Product Disclosure Statement obligations, see Corporations Regulations 
2001 (Cth) reg 7.9.07FA, inserting sub-s (7A) into Corporations Act s 1012D. Note, however, that some 
basic information about costs, amounts payable, and, if relevant, the financial claims scheme, must be 
provided. Similarly, the obligations in relation to Financial Services Guides, Statements of Advice, and 
the best interests obligation are not applicable or are reduced where the transaction involves, or refers to, 
only a basic deposit product or another specified product: see, eg, Corporations Act ss 941C(6), 946B(5), 
961B(3). 
170 The Code obligations apply in relation to ‘banking services’, defined as ‘any financial service or product 
provided by us in Australia to you’: 2013 Code cl 42 (definition of ‘banking services’). 
171 See Segal, above n 47, 10. See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission to the 
Review of the Code of Banking Practice (Submission, September 2000) 12–13 <http://www.review 
bankcode.com/pdfs/4.pdf>. 
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purposes of FSR’.P938F172P Subsequently, ASIC Regulatory Guides have been used to 
provide further detail for the FSR disclosure obligations.P939F173 
However, the Banking Code does give body to other general consumer 
protections enshrined in legislation, including the prohibition against 
unconscionable conduct in the context of third party guarantors.  
The NCC includes specific protection for third party guarantors that mirror 
protections found in the former UCCC. These include obligations for pre-
contractual disclosure of the terms and conditions of the guarantee,P940F174 P limits on 
liability,P941F175P notification of changes to terms and conditions,P942F176P and requirements 
that must be met before a guarantee can be enforced.P943F177P However, as explained 
above, these and other provisions in the NCCPA and NCC apply only to 
guarantees that secure consumer loans. Further, the protections in the NCC do not 
specifically address some of the procedural problems that are frequently noted in 
litigation and research on third party guarantees.P944F178P  
Given these limitations, third party guarantors have often relied upon the 
broader equitable and statutory prohibitions of unconscionable conduct or unjust 
contracts to obtain a remedy.P945F179P In many cases involving third party guarantors, a 
decision about whether the conduct is unconscionable, or the contract is unjust, 
has considered procedural matters, such as whether the lender left the borrower 
with the responsibility of explaining the transaction, and gaining the guarantor’s 
agreement.P946F180 
                                                 
172 Viney Review Final Report, above n 66, 39. See also discussion of the reasons why in Viney Review 
Issues Paper, above n 64, 46–8. 
173 See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 168 – Disclosure: Product 
Disclosure Statements (and Other Disclosure Obligations) (at 28 October 2011). 
174 NCC s 56. 
175 NCC ss 60–1. 
176 NCC pt 4 div 1. 
177 NCC s 90. 
178 For a discussion of some of the common issues arising in third party guarantees in the context of findings 
from empirical research, see Jenny Lovric and Jenni Millbank, ‘Darling, Please Sign This Form: A 
Report on the Practice of Third Party Guarantees in New South Wales’ (Research Report No 11, New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission, October 2003) 146–52.  
179 See, eg, ASIC Act s12BB (unconscionability); unconscionability as discussed in Commercial Bank of 
Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) s 7 (unjust contracts). The 
prohibition against unjust transactions in the NCC s 76 suffers the same limitation as the specific 
guarantor provisions, in that it does not apply where a guarantee is provided for a business loan. For a 
detailed discussion of the general law and statutory provisions that may be available to provide some 
relief for third party guarantors, see New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 164, 10–28. 
For a discussion the applicability of these general consumer protections in some more recent matters 
seeking to challenge a third party guarantee, see Denise McGill and Nicola Howell, ‘Improving the 
Ability of Guarantors To Make a Real Choice: Lenders’ Practices in Taking Third Party Guarantees’ 
(2013) 24 Journal and Banking and Finance Law and Practice 182, 186–95. 
180 See, eg, Wenczel v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2006] VSC 324, discussed in McGill and Howell, 
above n 179, 186. 
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The Banking Code operates to provide more detail for these broad 
prohibitions specifically in the context of third party guarantees. For example, the 
2013 Code gives guarantors explicit rights to disclosure of information about the 
borrower and proposed credit facility,P947F181P and an overnight cooling off period.P948F182 P It 
also provides additional safeguards such as not permitting the lender to give the 
debtor the guarantee to arrange for the signing, and, if the bank is present at the 
signing, requiring that the guarantee is signed in the absence of the debtor.P949F183 P 
These protections reflect factors that have been important in court determinations 
about whether a particular contract is unconscionable or unjust under the 
common law or statutory provisions, so that compliance with the relevant clauses 
in the Banking Code would be likely to reduce the risk of the lender engaging in 
prohibited conduct.P950F184P  
In 2006, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission described the 
Banking Code as having been ‘in the vanguard of developing protections for 
guarantors over the past decade’.P951F185P An analysis of recent cases involving third 
party guarantors in superior courts found that the majority of those involved 
financial institutions that did not subscribe to the Banking Code or indeed the  
Mutual Banking Code of Practice (‘Mutual Banking Code’), now the Customer 
Owned Banking Code, which has some similar protections.P952F186 P This highlights the 
importance of the Banking Code protections for guarantors.  
The role of the Banking Code in providing more detail to support broad 
legislative obligations is also highlighted by the specific reference to the 
requirements of relevant industry codes as a matter that can be considered for the 
purpose of determining statutory unconscionability. P953F 187 P In addition, cases have 
suggested that the Banking Code could be relevant as evidence of industry 
practice for the purpose of implying a term into a contract (on the grounds of 
                                                 
181 2013 Code cl 31.4(b). 
182 2013 Code cl 31.5(b). 
183 2013 Code cl 31.6. 
184 See discussion in New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 164, 66–8: ‘It is no doubt true 
that important court decisions … have influenced legislation and industry practice to adopt measures 
which promote procedural fairness when financial institutions enter into contracts with guarantors’. 
185 Ibid 78. 
186 McGill and Howell, above n 179, 197. 
187 ASIC Act ss 12CC(1)(g)–(h). In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Starrs [2012] SASC 222, [117] –
[118], Peek J suggested that significant breaches of the Banking Code could be relevant to establishing 
unconscionability. For an example of a case where unconscionability was argued, unsuccessfully, on the 
basis of non-compliance with an applicable industry code (under the former Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth)), see Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR ¶41-703.  
572 UNSW Law Journal Volume 38(2) 
business efficacy), P954F188P or as relevant for establishing a claim based on equitable 
principles.P955F189 
 
4 Regulatory Dance: The Changing Relationship between the Banking Code 
and Legislation  
A fourth example illustrates a more complex relationship between the 
Banking Code and legislation. In this example, a particular policy issue is 
addressed in both regulatory instruments, but over time, the higher standards 
swap between legislation and the Banking Code.  
This can be seen in the setting of standards in relation to financial hardship. 
The 1993 Code did not include any reference to the banks’ obligations in the 
event of a customer experiencing financial difficulties with credit contracts. In 
the period between the release of the 1993 Code and the Viney Review, the 
UCCC came into force, and section 66 of the UCCC allowed consumers to seek a 
variation (of a specified type) of their credit contract on the grounds of 
hardship.P956F190P However, the provisions in the UCCC were limited in their scope and 
operation. In particular, hardship applications could only be made if the hardship 
was caused by specified grounds,P957F 191 P and the amount of credit was below a 
maximum threshold,P958F192P and there were only three types of variations that could be 
made to the contract.P959F193 
The way in which banks responded to customers in financial difficulty was 
also criticised by consumer advocates in their submissions to the Viney 
Review.P960F194 P As a result, the 2003 Code and the 2004 Modified Code included  
new obligations for members when dealing with financial difficulty. Unlike  
the UCCC provisions, these obligations did not limit the options available  
for addressing the financial difficulties; nor was there any monetary  
threshold applicable to the obligations.P961F 195 P These obligations extended also to 
small businesses, where the UCCC did not.P962F196 
                                                 
188 See the suggestion in ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Stafford [2010] QSC 289, [32] (Daubney J). Note that 
this point was not specifically addressed in the Court of Appeal decision. 
189 See, eg, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Starrs [2012] SASC 222, [118], where Peek J suggested that 
‘establishing that significant breaches of the Code occurred may be very important if they are relevant to 
a defined cause of action such as Amadio or Garcia unconscionability’. The reference here was to the 
cases of Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 and Garcia v National Australia 
Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
190 UCCC s 66, now NCC s 72. 
191 The specified grounds were ‘illness, unemployment or other reasonable cause’: UCCC s 66(1). 
192 UCCC s 66(3). 
193 UCCC s 66(2). 
194 Viney Review Issues Paper, above n 64, 63–5.  
195 2004 Modified Code cl 25.2. 
196 UCCC s 6(1). 
2015 Revisiting the Australian Code of Banking Practice 573 
The McClelland Review recommended further changes to the financial 
difficulty clause in the Banking Code.P963F197 P However, before the 2013 Code was 
finalised, the NCCPA, including the NCC, came into force. The NCC, as first 
implemented, included a financial hardship provision in section 72 that was in 
similar terms to section 66 of the UCCC. However, in 2012, section 72 of the 
NCC was amended, P964F198 P and there is now no monetary threshold for a hardship 
application under section 72 of the NCC; nor is there any specification of the 
permitted grounds for acceding to a hardship request, or limitation as to the types 
of variations that can be agreed.P965F199 P Further, the amendments introduced for the 
first time a time frame within which credit providers must respond to the 
hardship request.P966F200 
Then, a short time after the NCC changes came into effect, the 2013 Code 
was released, and this imposed further obligations on Banking Code subscribers 
in relation to financial hardship, including more positive obligations in relation to 
trying to help customers overcome their financial difficulties, dealing with an 
authorised financial counsellor on request, and initiating contact with customers 
who appear to be experiencing financial difficulties.P967F201P These financial difficulty 
obligations apply whether or not the credit is also governed by the hardship 
provisions in the NCC, and thus they apply to small business customers that are 
experiencing financial difficulty. 
The Banking Code provisions therefore build on the legislative obligation, 
and the relationship between the Banking Code provisions and the legislation 
might be described as a regulatory dance, with first one, then the other, leading 
the dance.  
Recently, the banks have gone even further, supplementing the Banking Code 
provisions with additional initiatives to support customers in financial difficulty, 
including an industry guideline on financial difficulty, a commitment to visible 
disclosure in branches and websites about the availability of hardship assistance, 
standardised forms for use by financial counsellors in representing customers, 
and a commitment to a minimum standard of training about bank hardship 
                                                 
197 McClelland Review Final Report, above n 70, 46–7 recommendation 3. 
198 Consumer Credit Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 pt 1. 
199 However, the NCC does include the following note to s 72(3):  
The credit provider need not agree to change the credit contract, especially if the credit provider:  
(a) does not believe there is a reasonable cause (such as illness or unemployment) for the debtor’s 
inability to meet his or her obligations; or  
(b) reasonably believes the debtor would not be able to meet his or her obligations under the contract 
even if it were changed. 
200 NCC ss 72(4)–(5). 
201 2013 Code cl 28. 
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obligations.P968F 202 P Perhaps the future will also see some of these more recent 
commitments given further prominence and enforceability by incorporation into 
the next iteration of the Banking Code and/or in further amendments to the 
NCCPA. 
This example suggests that the gradual improvement in standards may have 
occurred in part because the policy issue is dealt with in both the Banking Code 
and the legislation. This is consistent with Webb’s idea of codes and  
self-regulation as providing a space for incubation of regulatory ideas,  
which, when tested and found relevant and practicable through codes, can  
be implemented through legislation, thus giving greater coverage and 
enforceability.P969F203P Subsequent to this, codes can continue to develop and test new 
and improved standards, such that they can perhaps be incorporated into 
legislation in the future, thus continuing the regulatory dance. 
 
IV   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANKING CODE AND 
OTHER SELF-REGULATORY OR CO-REGULATORY 
INITIATIVES 
The above discussion has highlighted the various relationships between the 
Banking Code and consumer protection legislation in Australia. However, to gain 
a full appreciation of the potential for the Banking Code to influence standards in 
the financial services sector, it is also necessary to consider how the Banking 
Code relates to other forms of self-regulation or co-regulation in the sector. Here, 
it can be seen that the relationships also resemble a form of regulatory dance, at 
least as between industry codes. There is also the potential for the imposition of 
Code standards upon non-Code members through decision-making in the EDR 
schemes.  
 
A   Regulatory Dance with Other Industry Codes 
As well as a regulatory dance between the Banking Code and legislation, 
there is a potential for regulatory dances to occur between industry codes. Here, 
the development of, and continuous improvement in, a single industry code is 
influenced by the standards in other relevant industry codes (including codes  
in other jurisdictions). This potential has been recognised and exploited by 
consumer advocates in their submissions to the various code reviews in the 
financial sector; in a submission to the recent review of the Mutual Banking 
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2015 Revisiting the Australian Code of Banking Practice 575 
Code, two of the key consumer organisations in this sector stated ‘[w]e are also 
eager to see a strong Mutuals Code because it will put pressure on banks and the 
Banking Code to continually improve’.P970F204 
It seems clear that the 2004 Modified Code had a significant influence on the 
transition from the Credit Union Code of Practice (which was in similar terms to 
the 1993 Code) to the Mutual Banking Code, which was released in July 2009.P971F205 P 
In fact the Mutual Banking Code did more than replicate standards in the 2004 
Modified Code; it extended and built upon a number of those standards. For 
example, the Mutual Banking Code included a series of 10 ‘key promises’,P972F206 P 
which are similar to, and also expand upon, the ‘key commitments’ in the 2004 
Modified Code. The Mutual Banking Code also included specific provisions on 
responsible lending, credit limit increase offers, and reverse mortgages, which 
went further than the credit assessment provision in the 2004 Modified Code,P973F207 P 
and detailed protections for third party guarantors that were similar to those in 
the 2004 Modified Code.P974F208 
Consumer advocates have also argued for the adoption of some of the 
standards of the 2013 Code in the recent review of the Mutual Banking Code. For 
example, consumer advocates argued that the Mutual Banking Code should 
include recognition of customers with special needs, as in the 2013 Code. The 
reviewer agreed that it would be appropriate to recognise in the key promises that 
some customers have special needs.P975F209 P The resulting instrument, the Customer 
Owned Banking Code, now includes reference to appropriate tailoring of service 
standards where customers have special needs.P976F210 
Standards in codes from other jurisdictions are also highlighted for inclusion 
in the Banking Code. For example, in the Viney Review, consumer advocates 
expressed support of the key commitments in the then United Kingdom Code of 
Banking Practice,P977F 211 P and the 2003 Code and 2004 Modified Code ultimately 
included some key commitments similar to those in the United Kingdom Code.P978F212 P 
The introduction of a fairness commitment in the Banking Code was also based 
on the existence of fairness clauses in the United Kingdom Banking Code and the 
New Zealand Banking Code. P979F213 
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Of course, the efforts by consumer advocates, and independent reviewers, to 
argue for increased standards in one code based on the standards in other codes 
are not always successful. For example, in the McClelland Review, consumer 
advocates urged the adoption of a new responsible lending obligation that  
was based, in part, on more explicit standards proposed for the then draft  
Mutual Banking Code.P980F214P The reviewer agreed with the underlying concern, and 
recommended that a new key commitment be added to the Banking Code that 
incorporated the suggestion of consumer advocates.P981F215P This recommendation was 
initially accepted partially by the industry, P982F216 P but was ultimately not included in 
the 2013 Code in either the form recommended by the reviewer, or in the form 
suggested by the industry.P983F217P  
Consumer advocates also argued for some of the standards in the Banking 
Code to be adopted in the General Insurance Code of Practice. In particular, 
consumer advocates argued that, as was the case with the Banking Code, 
compliance with the General Insurance Code of Practice should be made a term 
of the contract.P984F218 P Again, this suggestion was adopted in part by the reviewer, 
who recommended that compliance with a subset of the Code be made a term of 
the contract.P985F219P However, this recommendation was only partially implemented in 
the revised General Insurance Code of Practice, with the Code simply providing 
that subscribers ‘must comply’ with obligations in relation to time frames for 
claims.P986F220 
While not all efforts to increase the standards in one code by reference to 
standards in other codes are successful, the successful examples above do 
demonstrate the potential for the Banking Code and other financial sector codes 
to increase standards across codes in a regulatory dance that, over time, 
facilitates continuous improvement in industry standards. 
 
B   Setting the Standards for ‘Good Industry Practice’ for Use by Dispute 
Resolution Bodies 
The Banking Code can also influence community and legal understandings of 
what is good industry practice, even for non-subscribers. For example, the 
standards imposed in the Banking Code (and other industry codes) can be 
considered by both FOS and the Credit and Investments Ombudsman (‘CIO’) in 
their dispute resolution activities, even when they are dealing with a dispute 
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about an industry member that is not a subscriber to a particular code.P987F221 P For 
example, in its rules, CIO notes that when considering what is good practice in 
the financial services industry CIO may 
have regard to an applicable code of practice or industry or regulatory guideline or 
protocol which has application in the industry in which the financial services 
provider operates and which the scheme reasonably considers reflects good 
industry practice, even if the financial services provider has not subscribed to that 
code of practice or industry or regulatory guideline or protocol. P988F222 
In its operational guidelines, FOS goes further and notes that it ‘will not 
necessarily be bound by the minimum standard that may be set in a particular 
industry code’, but may expect higher standards.P989F223P Thus, an individual industry 
code, such as the Banking Code, has the potential to influence standards in the 
financial sector more generally, including the standards that are required (by 
other codes) or expected (through the EDR schemes) of financial service 
providers that do not subscribe to the Banking Code. 
 
V   THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING CODE 
This review of the provisions of the Banking Code and relevant consumer 
protection legislation illustrates a sometimes complicated relationship between 
self-regulation and government regulation, where both contribute to a process of 
continuous improvement in standards in the financial services sector. On some 
policy issues, legislation provides the most comprehensive standards, and the role 
of the Banking Code is limited. Despite this, the Banking Code retains an 
important role through: 
• providing protections in areas that are not covered by legislation, 
including where legislation may not be an appropriate policy response; 
• providing coverage for some customers and products that are not covered 
by equivalent legislative protections; 
• providing body or detail for broadly framed consumer protections; 
• engaging in a regulatory dance with relevant legislation, where, over 
time, the highest standards swap between the Banking Code and the 
legislation; and 
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• influencing the standards imposed upon, and expected of, other members 
of the financial services sector.  
Therefore, despite the fact that, on some key policy issues, the Banking Code 
rules have now largely been superseded by legislative rules, the above analysis 
points to the continuing relevance of the Banking Code in particular, and self-
regulation in general, in the regulatory mix for consumer protection in financial 
services.  
However, the Banking Code is not without its critics. In 2012, Andrew 
Wilkie MP presented a private member’s bill to the Commonwealth Parliament: 
the Banking Amendment (Banking Code of Conduct) Bill 2012 (Cth).P990F224P The Bill 
provided for a mandatory Banking Code of Conduct (based on the then current 
Banking Code) to be made by the relevant Minister, and to be enforced by the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, which would have the power  
to impose civil penalties for ‘particularly grievous breaches of the code’.P991F225P In 
explaining the impetus for the Bill, Mr Wilkie argued that: ‘[t]here is clear 
evidence that the current voluntary Code of Banking Practice – set up by the 
banks, run by the banks, overseen by the banks – does not work and is a toothless 
tiger’.P992F226P Mr Wilkie also indicated that he was prompted to act by concerns about 
the Banking Code expressed by the Tasmanian Small Business Council.P993F227 
Concerns about the conduct of banks towards small businesses were also 
raised in a 2012 Senate Committee report on the post-GFC banking sector.P994F228 P  
In this context, the Committee referred to the Banking Code as providing  
some safeguards for small businesses,P995F 229 P and also noted the non-applicability  
of the consumer credit legislation to small businesses. P996F230 P However, rather than 
recommending a legislative response, or an expansion of the Banking Code 
provisions, the Committee recommended that the banking industry establish a 
separate code of conduct for small business lending.P997F231 P This suggests that the 
provisions of the Banking Code in relation to credit assessment and hardship 
have not necessarily worked to allay all concerns from small businesses about 
banking practices.  
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Concerns about the effectiveness of the Banking Code are not limited  
to small business representatives. Consumer advocates generally supported  
the scope and provisions of the 2013 Code on its release.P998F 232 P However, in  
their submission to the McClelland Review, consumer advocates were  
strongly supportive of the need for a broader range of sanctions for Banking 
Code breaches,P999F 233 P and raised concerns about, among other things, the level  
of compliance in relation to some provisions,P1000F 234 P the lack of universal Code 
membership,P1001F235P and the proposals to reduce the applicability of some protections 
on the grounds of competitive neutrality. P1002F 236 P No changes were made to the 
Banking Code to address these concerns following the McClelland Review.  
One example which highlights consumer concerns about the effectiveness of 
the compliance and enforcement mechanisms is the evidence of non-compliance 
with the Banking Code’s provisions on direct debits.P1003F237 P Despite few instances 
making their way as complaints to FOS or the CCMC, P1004F238 P small ‘shadow shop’ 
surveys by the CCMC and by the consumer group CHOICE have found a high 
proportion of enquiries made to banks about direct debit rights resulted in 
information or advice that was inconsistent with the Banking Code obligations.P1005F239 P 
In this context, one commentator has suggested that ‘the bank industry’s inability 
to address breaches of a code that’s been in place for almost 10 years indicates 
that self-regulation isn’t working’. P1006F240 
Other criticisms that can be made of the scope and operation of the Banking 
Code include the failure of the Banking Code to deal with financial exclusion in 
consumer credit, despite financial exclusion being significant and growing in 
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Australia;P1007F241P the long delays with implementing the accepted recommendations 
from the McClelland Review; P1008F242P and the provision for an extended time between 
reviews. On this last point, it is worth noting that the 2004 Modified Code was to 
be reviewed after three years of operation, but with the long implementation time 
frame of the McClelland Review, this Code had an effective life of almost 10 
years. In the 2013 Code, a review is now required after five years of operation, 
after February 2019.P1009F 243 P If the previous implementation timetable were to be 
repeated (two years for the review, five years for implementation), this could see 
the 2013 Code operate from 2014 to perhaps 2026. Although it is true that the 
Banking Code is now a mature code, strongly established in the banking sector, 
the financial services sector remains a complex and fast-changing one. Given that 
industry codes are promoted as being flexible and responsive to changes in the 
relevant sector and regulatory environment, the prospect of the Banking Code 
having such a long life is incongruous. 
To date, there appears to have been limited acknowledgment of the validity 
of these and other criticisms of the Banking Code by the industry. In a media 
release, the Chief Executive of the ABA rejected the suggestion of Mr Wilkie 
that the Banking Code was a toothless tiger, and explained the enforcement 
options in the event of a breach of the Banking Code in the following way: 
The Code of Banking Practice is a contract between customers and subscribing 
banks which means courts can review compliance with the code. Banks’ small 
business customers and individual customers have a number of avenues they can 
take a complaint if they believe that a bank has breached the Code of Banking 
Practice. They can go to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), the Code 
Compliance Monitoring Committee (CCMC) and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC).P1010F244P  
However, relying on these three bodies or the courts (and tribunals) for 
enforcement of the Banking Code is not entirely satisfactory. Each suffers from 
limitations in their ability to provide redress and/or make findings about Code 
breaches.  
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First, as mentioned above, most disputes made to FOS are resolved without 
the need for a FOS decision.P1011F245P Even where a FOS decision is required, FOS does 
not necessarily always identify Banking Code breaches.P1012F246P As a result, a disputant 
may be awarded a remedy, but may not receive a definitive statement from FOS 
as to whether or not a bank has breached the Banking Code.P1013F247P  
Secondly, while the CCMC can make a finding about a Code breach,  
it receives relatively small numbers of complaints,P1014F 248 P has only one sanction 
available to it in the event of identifying a breach,P1015F249P and has had the scope of its 
jurisdiction curtailed somewhat in the 2013 Code (and accompanying CCMC 
Mandate).P1016F250P  
Thirdly, ASIC has no independent power to investigate an allegation of non-
compliance with the Banking Code unless the conduct also involves a potential 
contravention of the ASIC Act or Corporations Act (or another piece of 
legislation for which ASIC has enforcement responsibilities).P1017F251 
Finally, some customers have sought to argue a breach of the Banking Code 
in litigation, as part of a claim or series of claims against a Code-subscribing 
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bank. Despite the suggestion by the ABA that the courts will be able to review 
compliance with the Code, and other support for the proposition that Code-
subscribing banks are contractually bound by the code,P1018F252 P there has not been a 
consistent approach by the courts to the status and enforceability of the Banking 
Code.  
For example, in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Starrs, Peek J  
expressed the view that ‘the Code is largely a collection of “dos and don’ts” of 
bankers’ conduct’,P1019F253P although he thought that significant breaches of the Banking  
Code could be relevant to establishing unconscionability.P1020F254 P In Bank of Western 
Australia Ltd v Abdul, Croft J expressed the view that ‘the Code of Banking 
Practice does not, in the present circumstances, have any contractual force’.P1021F255P In 
ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Leagrove Pty Ltd, the Court considered, and rejected, 
an argument that there was an implied term in the contract that the guarantees 
would be Banking Code compliant.P1022F256P  
On the other hand, in Brighton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd, the New South Wales Court of Appeal appeared to accept that the Banking 
Code was incorporated into the guarantee contract by reference;P1023F257P however, the 
parties were unable to obtain the remedy of terminating the contract. The Court 
found that the term in question was not a condition, and even if the term was an 
intermediate term, there was not a sufficiently serious breach of the term that 
would give rise to the right to terminate the contract.P1024F258P Similarly, in Williams v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the bank accepted that the Banking Code 
formed part of its contract with the plaintiff, and that clauses in the Banking 
Code were breached.P1025F259P However, Pembroke J found that no loss was caused by 
the breaches, and there was therefore no remedy for the plaintiff.P1026F260 
While this variance in judicial approach remains, relying on the courts and 
contract law as a mechanism for enforcing the Banking Code may be more 
uncertain than the positive statement of the ABA suggests.  
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On other concerns of small businesses, the ABA responded to an earlier 
Senate Committee recommendation for a code of practice for small business 
lending with the comment that ‘[t]he current Code of Banking Practice already 
applies to small businesses and the ABA is always willing to meet with small 
businesses and their representative organisations to discuss any improvements’.P1027F261 
In relation to concerns about compliance with the Banking Code provisions 
on direct debits, the ABA’s Chief Executive has been reported as saying that 
‘[b]ank staff need more information about the processes involved to cancel a 
direct debit’ and as indicating that the industry is developing information for both 
consumers and staff.P1028F262P  
The Australian government’s attitude to the recommendations for a small 
business lending code is not known. The former government did not issue a 
response to the 2012 report, and a representative from the current government 
indicated, on 11 December 2013, that it did ‘not intend to respond to the report as 
this matter is being considered as part of the government’s Financial System 
Inquiry’.P1029F 263 P Interestingly, in one of the only areas where it has suggested a 
specific change to an industry code, the FSI has recommended that the Banking 
Code be adjusted to address the use of non-monetary default clauses, a concern 
raised by small businesses.P1030F264 
Ultimately, as an industry code, it is the industry members that will determine 
the standards that they are prepared to commit to through the Banking Code. 
There is more, however, that could be done to encourage the banking industry to 
address these and other concerns about the scope and administration of the 
Banking Code. Although it is often argued that effective self-regulation requires 
that a government be willing to ‘step in and escalate from self-regulation to 
command’,P1031F265P there does not appear to be any real regulatory threat in relation to 
the continuation and/or improvement of the Banking Code today.P1032F266 P However, 
there are a number of implicit benefits accruing to the banking industry as a 
result, in part, of the existence of the Banking Code. For example, a 
representative from the ABA has noted that the 2004 Modified Code:  
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has been cited as one of the reasons why the Corporations Act requirements for 
bank basic deposit accounts could be wound back, because of the standards in 
place via the Code of Banking Practice and the EFT Code.P1033F267 P  
In the case of a ‘basic deposit product’, neither a Financial Services GuideP1034F268 P 
nor a Statement of AdviceP1035F 269 P is required to be provided, and, in specified 
circumstances, a Product Disclosure Statement is not required, or can be 
provided at a later time than is the case for most other financial products.P1036F270 
In addition, authorised deposit-taking institutions (‘ADIs’), including the 
banks, have been exempted from other recently imposed regulations, including 
some of the recent amendments to the NCC and NCCPA to impose price controls 
of consumer credit products. P1037F271P The fact that ADIs ‘are subject to a broader range 
of prudential and regulatory oversight than other classes of credit providers’ was 
cited as part of the reason for this exemption; the Banking Code (and the 
Customer Owned Banking Code) are regulatory instruments that do not apply to 
non-ADI credit providers, and are therefore part of the ‘broader … regulatory 
oversight’ of ADIs that justifies this exemption.P1038F272 
However, these regulatory benefits accrue equally to businesses that 
subscribe to the Banking Code (or similar code) and those that do not. Perhaps an 
approach to facilitate further improvements that is likely to be more successful 
than a regulatory threat is to make explicit the various regulatory benefits, and 
make them available only to financial services providers that subscribe to an 
ASIC-approved code.P1039F273P A precedent for such an approach does exist in relation 
to the exemption from certain obligations in the Corporations Act that is 
available to members of ASIC-approved codes.P1040F274P This provides an illustration of 
a mechanism capable of ensuring that regulatory benefits provided, in part, 
because of the existence of industry codes, are granted only to those industry 
members that have subscribed to a relevant code.  
The ASIC-approval process alone is, of course, no guarantee that the 
concerns identified above will be addressed. However, this process provides for 
more detailed assessment of the benefits of an industry code, including by 
requiring, for example:  
                                                 
267 Godfrey, above n 14, 179. 
268 Corporations Act s 941C(6). 
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271 ADIs are exempt from the 48 per cent price cap on credit contracts, other than small amount credit 
contracts: NCC s 32A, and small amount credit contracts, which are also subject to price controls, are 
defined to exclude products offered by ADIs: see NCCPA s 5(1) (definition of ‘small amount credit 
contract’). 
272 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Consumer Credit Legislation Amendment (Enhancement) Bill 2012 
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• that the code addresses the existing or emerging problems in the 
marketplace;P1041F275P and if it does not, that a detailed explanation of why the 
code does not deal with identified consumer concerns or undesirable 
practices be provided;P1042F276P  
• that there are a range of remedies and sanctions for non-compliance;P1043F277 P 
and  
• that independent reviews occur at intervals of no more than three years.P1044F278 
Seeking approval of the Banking Code in light of these and other criteria 
might encourage the banking industry to engage more deeply with the concerns 
identified above.  
 
VI   CONCLUSION  
The Banking Code is described by the ABA as ‘the banking industry’s 
customer charter on best banking practice standards’.P1045F279P The two previous major 
incarnations of the Banking Code represented significant advances on the 
consumer protections available at the time, with the result that customers of 
subscribers to the Banking Code were afforded greater protections than 
customers of many other financial institutions.P1046F280 P The third major incarnation of 
the Banking Code was developed following the McClelland Review, but the 
rapid pace of legislative change outstripped the drafting and implementation 
response, with the result that many of the recommendations of the review were 
superseded by legislation. Further, earlier advances in consumer protection 
delivered by the Banking Code were also overtaken by legislative developments.  
Despite this, the Banking Code still has a significant role in the regulation of 
the financial services sector, and, through the complicated, sometimes dance-like 
relationships between the Banking Code, legislation, other agreements and 
guidelines, other industry codes, and the EDR schemes, in contributing to the 
continuous improvement of standards in the sector. Its future as part of the 
regulatory framework for financial services seems assured.  
The Banking Code is not a perfect instrument. Among other things, there 
remain concerns about compliance in some areas and the mechanisms for 
enforcement when there is non-compliance, tensions in regards to aspirational 
matters and competitive neutrality, and a lack of coverage of one of the 
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significant emerging issues in the banking sector, that of financial exclusion from 
consumer credit. Despite these criticisms, the Banking Code (and by extension 
self-regulation) has played, and can continue to play, an important role in the 
financial services sector. The FSI has acknowledged this role in broad terms, and 
its view that self-regulation and industry codes should continue to be part of the 
regulatory mix should be accepted by the Australian government. The 
government will need to ensure that any changes to the regulatory framework 
following the FSI will facilitate and support the self-regulation role. However, 
the government should also consider whether the implicit regulatory benefits 
accruing due, at least in part, to the existence of self-regulatory instruments like 
the Banking Code need to be made explicit and tied to membership of an ASIC-
approved code. In turn, this may encourage the banking industry to address some 
of the outstanding issues and criticisms, and ensure that the Banking Code can 
fulfil its potential to deliver high standards and continuous improvement for 
consumers and small businesses. 
 
 
 
 
